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Out< C: It iNA 
In any discussion of China policy two premises ought to 
be agreed upon at the outset. Unless they are, we will end by obscur-
ing the very issues which we are supposed to clarify. 
First of all, China is not merely a group of political and 
military chieftains on the island of Formosa. Nor is it a few Chinese 
Marxist~tb a m' it L r in Peking, or--as they are at present--in Moscow. 
We mean or should mean when we speak of China theA~¢ sue million 
Chinese people who possess a very ancient and distinct culture and who, 
during the past half century have come to develop an increasing aware-
ness of their national unity. They constitute the China towards which 
the friendly hand of the United States traditionally has been extended. 
They are the China we have long sought to encourage in the direction of 
democracy and freedom from foreign control. 
In the second place, we ought to agree that China policy is 
not solely the question of "to aid or not to aid" Chiang Kai-shek, but 
rather the whole course of action and inaction in our relations with 
that country. The question we must ask ourselves is whether the course 
we have set is the best that can be pursued under existing circumstances. 
Does it serve all the interests of the United States? Not merely our 
commercial interests in China, although they are of some importance; 
not merely our strategic interests in the Far East, although obviously 
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those too are important--but the entire range of American concern 
with China, the Far East and the rest of the world. 
~...t.wo .:t:u~~•at.J...&e.-ets-1.!1 m1n1r,---ve Shdl f11ld; 
I believe, that t~olicy followed in tu~ -~ General Marshall and Sec-
/../ ...... .....< / 
retary Achesonvduring the administ~.on of President Truman has been 
on the same bipartisan track ~ued by administration after administration 
--Republican and Democra~during the past half century. It should 
be kept on that espite the efforts of those, who for reasons of 
...afw.t.~~M~~rr;1~1:it"ics, w~ld d.erail H. 
little 
So much heat and so/light has been shed on this policy by 
the debate of the past few years that I should l ike to review briefly 
just \ohat we have done and what we have not done with respect to 
China. 
During the war and immediate postwar period, the United States 
extended both economic and military assistance to the Chinese. ~ 
.,..amormt-- ef that aeeietange ·.vee net large en~gh to satj sfy the more 
Yore cious of the KQamintang leadei e and the ii Amer~ fl'ienels. 1? 
the 
le>~~.-~ which.. W&n'G· .... ~s:t.a~'t:l1' -GTe--at ~tain. -
e, howevev, most o us were conc,'rned"'".QOt wi tb dfvidi\J.g the 1 " ~ \ 
heritance equally b~ ~th using ~xailAae American 
~ 
resources Th' 'fact 
see~ indicate that t~ decisions 
6f our wartime leaders in \his respect we~ at least reafonably correct. 
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Assistance given to China during the war, limited though it may 
have been, was the critical factor in saving a valued ally from colJapse 
and I think it is a bout time we stopped being ashamed of it. Am~ee:e 
..... <: 
~s •reo ~vad.. ~• -eb1&4Q ~the 
terrible human sacrifiee~· demanded qy the war. China's 1nterests also 
were served since that country emerged from the conf{ic~ in a· stronger 
and more independent position than itt had ever be£01"e't. occupied- :11\ the , 
Partly to complete our wartime commitments and partly to equip 
China for its greatly enhanced and important international role, the 
United States continued aid to China during the months following the end 
of the war. The Chinese people wanted the removal of the 3 million Japanese 
remaining in China. They wanted internal stability and rapid economic 
and political reconstruction. And above al:}. they wanted an end to civil 
war. 
ese 
any articular grou 
them in war, t 
General Marshall's mission a*••• was in accord with the wishes 
of the Chinese people. The General did not go to China to "force" Chiang 
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Kai-shek to accept CommUnists into his Government as has been so 
recklessly charged by some in this country. He went to help achieve 
what the Chinese people clearly and desperately desired--wha. t tre 
Generalissimo and the National Government had repeatedly proclaimed 
as their official policy--a settlement of the internal problem of 
unity ~ peaceful means. 
When it proved impossible to achieve such a settlement, 
President Truman reiterated the traditional policy of the United 
States--that we would not become directly involved in a Chinese civil 
war. That decision was applauded ~ the people of China, who were 
overwhelmingly opposed to the suicidal conflict being precipitated 
. ~t '~) 
~ co~se Al!rex lean effoxts 
h.as been great.-.. 
loans "8l1d grants since V--J Day. It is pos-~ible 
xaet- amorrtt and millions or- words have been wasted 
in pro~ng lhat it w s clo~~T to one billion or to three billion. 
The signifi ant ~s, h-. , are the:;e: During the first 
few weeks after the de eat of ~ the Uldrted States transported 
by sea and air 400,000 o 500,000 Na~l Government troops over 
and around the Communist forces to key rs of East and North China. 
The purpose of orderly surrender, 
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disarmament d repatriation of the Japanese. Fifty thousand American 
marines held such vital cities as Peiping, Tientsin and Tsingtao for 
months, thus preventing their seizure P.r the Chinese Communists. By 
the end of 1945 ve had deli~red gufficient tonnage to equip 39 divisions. 
of National Government ground forces and an 8 and 1/3 group air force. 
Wh8tever Japanese equipment the Chine Communists obtained vith the 
facilitation of the Russians in Manchuria as offset by the Japanese 
equipment surrendered to the Nationalist forces ~n North, Central and 
South China. 
In December, 1945, Chiang Kai-shek held a numerical superiority 
in combat forces over the Communists of 5 to 1. He had a monopoly of 
heavy equipment and mechanical transportation and an unopposed air arm. 
Yet, by December, 1948, exactly three years later, this preponderance 
of strength had been so dissipated that General Barr, head of our 
advisory mission in China, vas forced to conclude that without direct 
American involvement with its combat forces, the complete defeat of the 
Nationlist armies vas inevitable. 
What lies behind this colossal failure? We have the answer 
from Genera~Marshall , Wedemeyer, Barr and practically 
every other competent observer vho has had the opportunity to view 
the situation in China first hand. The failure was due not to any 
lack of arms and ammunition. The failure was due to the incredible 
ineptitude of the Nationalist Army command. It vas due to the inability 
or unwillingness of the Chinese Government to take the necessary and 
repeatedly-advised measures of social, economic, political and military 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 51, Folder 56, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
l 
- 6-
reform which alone could have ret ained for it, the support of the 
soldiers and the common people of China. It. was due to the d~wnright 
co:n;y.p:tion in o.fi'2c.ial circles. \ That .oorrup.'ti--en, a.ccording to the 
magui.n& IJ. S. News and World Report, resulted in the diversion of 
miallions. of /is Qt. U.S. aid,. int~J)ded for the ~e of the Chinese 
:eeople, itp.ilo the personal fortun:)i! of those who held power. Some 
of th~oney is bac~ here ip ~the United States in private bank 
/ / 
'aesrounts at this 'Very mome"nt.) 
In the face of the mass of evidence, there are still people 
who cling to the theory that the Yalta Agreement is at the root of all 
of China's difficulties. It follows, then, that since we participated 
in this dark and wicked conspiracy, we are guilty of some sort of gross 
betrayal. 
Let us see what this much-w~ligned agreement actually pro-
vided. Under its most pertinent clause, the United States committed 
itself to intercede with the Chinese Government in order to obtain t he 
return to the Soviet Union of certain limited port and naval concessions 
in Manchuria. They were substantially the same as had been lost ~ 
In return the Russians agreed to enter the war against Japan. 
Russia to Japan in 1904./ They also reaffirmed their recognition of 
China's sovereignty over all Manchuria; and consented to give assistance 
and support to China exclusively through the National Government. 
Military considerations were largely responsible for the 
American decisions at Yalta. It is all very well, with the wisdom of 
hindsight, to ridicule these considerations. But at the time, the war 
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with Japan was still of uncertain d:.tra.tion. Without the unforeseeeble 
impact of the atomic bomb on the outcome, hundreds of thousands of addi-
tional casualties might have been the price of the defeat of Japan. The 
administration wanted to share that toll as far as possible with other 
countries. No one, it seems to me, is justified in talking glibly of 
such a. consideration. 
The fact is that we could not have prevented, by any method 
short of war, the penetration of Manchuria by Russian imperialism, so 
we tried to limit it. The American people have never indicated a. 'Willing-
ness to go to war for the ejection of non-Chinese control from Manchuria.. 
Our traditional China policy has never countenanced such a. step. We did 
not go to war when the Russians originally penetrated the area. towards 
the close of the 19th Century. We did not go to war when the Japanese 
replaced them in 1904-- It was, as a matter of fact, President Theodore 
Roosevelt, who arranged that first 11 Ya.lta.11 agreement. And in 1931, 
another Republican administration refused to lead us into war over this 
issue when the Japanese expanded economic concessions into political 
domination of all Manchuria.. 
We have placed on record in the past our conviction that Manchuria. 
is Chinese territory. At Yalta we did so again. And we still believe 
Manchuria remains Chinese territory, regardless of the advantages taken 
by predatory neighbors in this time of China's weakness. But the task 
of restoring Manchuria to China in fact as well as in name is primarily 
the task of Chinese Nationalism. It is not now and it has never been 
the responsibility of the United States armed forces. 
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Rather than speak of Yalta as a gross and iniquitous 
"betrayal", I think it is time to recognize it for what it was--
the best possible chance, at the time, of preserving the long-term 
interests of both the United States and China. 
Another bogey has now made its appearance in connection with 
the island of Formosa. This time the Administration is accused, not 
of betraying the Chinese, but of betraying the Formosans who, inci-
dentally, are about 98 per cent Chinese. 
At the Cairo Conference in 1943, the United States pledged 
the restoration of Formosa to China. There was practically unanimous 
approval of that decision both in this country and in the Allied world. 
when the war ended, the Formosan Chinese welcomed the return of the 
National Government as a liberator. Chen Yi, an old friend of Genera-
lissimo Chiang Kai-shek was appointed the first Governor. Chen Yi 
found living standards on the island better than on the mainland. ~ 
communists. After a little more than one year of Chen Yi 1 s carpet-
bagging maladministration, the island was rocked by a fierce uprising 
against the mainlanders. Chen Yi crushed the revolt with a ruthless-
ness that claimed several thousand lives. ~~ ~~ net ~rprising that 
!Ml~l'lndsan.S"' 15e!ieve the!'r 10t--15a'Cl as it might: ave been und&r • 
~ J &Pfl!'Iese--WS" prefe'I'able to wnat they have su:ffe!'ed under -the 
Wati"Onal Government. 
,ve. 
Success~ and more enlightened governors, Wei 
Tao-ming, Chen Cheng and K. C. \olu have not been able to wipe out the 
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bitterness and hatred which the Formosan Chinese feel for their 
oppressors. 
It is in~o this ugly situation that we are now invited to 
project ourselves. Since a peace treaty with Japan has not yet been 
signed, a legal loophole exists whereby we might assume some sort of 
protectorate over Formosa. In this manner we might conveniently avoid 
or postpone in Chiang Kai-shek's int erest the pledge given to the 
Chinese peopl e at Cairo. This ignores the fact, however, that for 
three years we have not questioned Chinese control over the island and 
to do so now would be unabashed interference in internal Chinese affairs. 
Th,Qr' "gun boat" policy for Formosa currently being advocated 
in some quarters is not a new one. It was first proposed a hundred 
years ago by Admiral Perry and decisively rejected by the American 
people then. If we were to follow it now, we might be able with superior 
force to discourage the present Communist masters of China from seeking 
to take the island. But in doing so, we would give credence to the 
anti-American propaganda in the Orient that charges us with using our 
power for imperialist purposes. \olQ noule eonf'ounti our true II lends 4.~t 
China-not~ le!rdenrun-ii'ortHOS!! ob1rt-tbe·-9h±ne!'e~ .w~~·-tht 
VSX¥ momallt-et~& be-i~tg"· tc'M 'ffia~n~ 'lea:gtte wi"th' 'Cbi:!n-g-fuli-eflek 
+.o. ]C'eep.~J.&~~ We would build, in the final analysis, 
a lasting heritage of hatred just as the Russians are now busily doing 
in Manchuria, Sinkiang and Mongolia. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 51, Folder 56, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 10-
The situation in Formosa points up the key difficulty involved 
in keeping our China policy on the right track. We must discriminate 
between what we can do and what we cannot do both in a material and an 
ethical sense. There is no virtue in doing in foreign affairs just to 
be doing, and there are times when inaction is more effective from the 
point of view of American interests than action. 
The cardinal principle of United States China policy must remain 
what it always has been--recognition of the fact that the internal problems 
of the Chinese people, whether on the mainland or on Formosa, must be 
solved primarily by the Chinese people themselves. T~ do not want 
-arM-tflt!y"'\d-11-- not a~ie1!1e& iftdefi:ni-t.e!y in solutions forced upon them 
.by ...r~igll' i'l'lte'ne~. 
We cannot make ourselves responsible--militarily or otherwise--
for a regime which has been abandoned by the Chinese people. To do so 
would be the certain way of diverting XXKtr attention from the real threat 
to their nation arising in the North. 
We cannot continue to supply armaments to a Government which, 
the Communist leader Mao Tze-tung has callously, but unfortunately,with 
much accuracy, labelled his supply ser vice for the delivery of American 
equipment. 
We cannot, by conducting naval exercises in the path of an 
impending engagement in the Chinese civil war find a che~ and involve-
ment-free solution to the complex problem of China policy. It is irres-
ponsible and dangerous to threaten force unless you are prepared to 
use it. And I doubt that even those who advocate such a policy are 
ready to go to war over Formosa. 




We cannot on the other hand, give recognition t<=t-,~ government 
which shows little regard for the rights of our citizens and little res-
pect for even the most elementary international usages. There vould appear 
to be little point, moreover, in our association with a regime which claims 
to speak with the authentic voice of China but which has the accent of the 
Soviet Union. At the conclusion of the present and unexpectedly long 
talks in Moscow we may know better Whether that regL~e has abandoned the 
()'\. 
accent sa China 1 s fundamental interests. 
at we ~ do in the present cirau tances is to m~ntain our 
hi -- not in ~ h~full of exalted fi faith in 
re 
We can co~nue to help those 
sposal--through pJQlic anj private c 
' 
The Ch¥se{people will 
in their hour of ~al. 
forget acts 
through the Voice of America, the United Nations 
and other feasible ways, keep the attention of the Chinese and the world 
focused on the Soviet exploitation that is now going on in China's remote 
provinces. 
p1s~~ amnuni t 
agg~ess~ ve campai 
By lending encouragement to l egitimate nationalist aspirations 
and by extending practical economic assistance under Point Four to the 
countries surrounding China, we can demonstrate our genuine interest in 
the progress of all Asia . 
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Finally, we can keep our thinking on general foreign 
policy flexible. Only in this way will we be able to act appro-
priately in any given circumstances. Above all we must avoid the 
fallacy of beli eving that consistency in foreign policy lies in 
acting precisely in the same manner in every part of the globe. 
It is, for example, fantastic to suggest that what we have done in 
~I 
Greece we must also do in China, which has ~ times as many people, 
60 times as great an area and a vastly different set of political 
and strategic problems. 
The only consistency we need be concerned with is the 
consistency with which we devote ourselves to the protection of 
the security and all the legitimate interests of the United States. 
That is the basic ingredient of a non-partisan, non-political 
approach. Beyond it let us exercise a little imagination and a 
lot of discretion, . 
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